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Mediawatch: Bernard Dixon
reviews a television programme
charting possible consequences
of the terrorist use of smallpox. 
Judging by commentators’
reactions, Smallpox 2002 — Silent
Weapon, screened by the BBC in
the UK but to be shown in many
countries, was an outstanding
success in provoking fear and
loathing over an epidemic
triggered by a terrorist releasing
the virus. One reviewer said that
this was the programme to watch
“if you want to be scared – and
even made paranoid about
everybody you meet in the street,
even the air you breathe”. Many
others described the “mock-
documentary” as chillingly realistic.
Set in the near future, looking
back to events this year, the film
showed the consequences when
a lone individual infects himself
and then wanders around New
York. The infection, which many
doctors fail to recognize, spreads
like wildfire, leading to “the
greatest act of mass murder in
history”. 
A shortage of vaccine plus
panic over the disease itself lead
to rioting and looting. The virus
moves quickly to London and
other parts of the world.
Suspected victims are sent to
quarantine camps. Other people
head for remote areas to avoid 
the disease. Some are too
frightened to leave their 
homes. Within weeks, there are 
60 million dead.
Such a scenario neither
required nor received creative
embellishment. Instead, the
producers told the story through a
subtle blend of talking heads  and
a video diary kept by one family.
Alongside disturbing pictures of
smallpox victims and rows of
coffins, other elements of the
horror were almost under-stated.
So much for the style. What of
the substance? Could a calamity
of this sort really be launched by a
solitary madman (who left behind
a bible open at the Book of
Ezekiel)? 
Two assertions in the
programme provoke scepticism at
least. Firstly, an FBI Commander
said that “the greatest threat… to
our lives and security is a single
individual with a $50 chemistry set
and the will to decimate the
planet”. This was followed by the
bizarre allegation that, to infect
himself, the madman would
simply have needed to “take a
spec… of this virus… get a Petri
dish or brewing kit and culture it”.
Could the virus have come from
either of the two known remaining
laboratory stocks, one in the USA
and the other in Russia? Ken
Alibek, who ran the former USSR’s
biological weapons programme,
was on hand to give credence to
the latter possibility. Indeed, the
organism was identified as
India-1, the USSR’s “principal
battle strain”. 
But such a virus is far more
likely to have fallen into the hands
not of a solitary fanatic but of
state-sponsored terrorists. In that
case the country concerned
would surely, before launching an
attack, have mounted a
vaccination campaign for its own
population. This prudent
preparation would have become
widely known and aroused
suspicions accordingly.
The film’s portrayal of the rapid
dissemination of the organism
also raises questions. “By the time
New York had diagnosed its first
case, it was already too late. The
virus had moved on,” said the
voice-over. While this seems
entirely credible, given the speed
and volume of modern air travel,
accompanying remarks were
seriously misleading. 
For example, the agent of Ebola
fever was said to require direct
contact whereas that of smallpox
was airborne. Shortly afterwards,
we were shown shots of people
wearing gas masks as they roller-
skated down the street. This gave
the mistaken impression that the
virus could spread far and wide in
the air and on the wind.
Some urgent dilemmas facing
public health officials in
responding to an attack of this sort
were vividly explained. One was
the difficulty of deciding whether to
use a large but limited quantity of
vaccine to immunise New York’s
entire population before it became
clear whether, if the incident really
were a result of terrorism, other
cities would also be attacked. 
So could this scenario - which
led within days to New York’s
infrastructure unravelling and its
entire healthcare system being on
the point of collapse — actually
happen? Could it mean planet
Earth being caught up in “a
disaster of biblical proportions”?
Perhaps. Yet this was a very worst
possible case analysis. All stages,
from the fanatic’s procurement of
the virus to its dissemination,
were built upon the most
threatening premises, some of
them implausible.
There was also a tendency to
marginalise any good news, even
news that is no more than
relatively good. It was, for
example, very near the end of the
film when viewers were told that
two thirds of smallpox patients do
actually recover from the disease.
Likewise, the measured
comments of Donald Henderson
(who masterminded the WHO’s
eradication of smallpox two
decades ago) were screened after
the programme itself finished.
“Any release of smallpox is going
to challenge us in a very serious
way,” Henderson said. “So we
have to be ready to move very
quickly and effectively with a large
amount of vaccine...We are now
approaching the point where we
are going to be able to do that.
But we are not going to be able to
pick up all cases. Although we are
better and better and better
prepared, I’m never going to be in
a position to say we can relax.”
While showing that even this
pandemic was controlled by mass
vaccination and containment,
Smallpox 2002 — Silent Weapon
was based upon a far less
reassuring script. The programme
was all the more effective
because it was largely 
completed before the events of 
11 September last year, rather
than in response to them. If it has
reminded public health and public
authorities graphically of a terrible
disease, then it will have done
much good.
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